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A B S T R A C T
Research on car dependence exposes the difficulty of moving away from a car-dominated, high-carbon transport
system, but neglects the political-economic factors underpinning car-dependent societies. Yet these factors are
key constraints to attempts to ‘decouple' human well-being from energy use and climate change emissions. In
this critical review paper, we identify some of the main political-economic factors behind car dependence,
drawing together research from several fields. Five key constituent elements of what we call the ‘car-dependent
transport system’ are identified: i) the automotive industry; ii) the provision of car infrastructure; iii) the political
economy of urban sprawl; iv) the provision of public transport; v) cultures of car consumption. Using the
‘systems of provision’ approach within political economy, we locate the part played by each element within the
key dynamic processes of the system as a whole. Such processes encompass industrial structure, political-eco-
nomic relations, the built environment, and cultural feedback loops. We argue that linkages between these
processes are crucial to maintaining car dependence and thus create carbon lock-in. In developing our argument
we discuss several important characteristics of car-dependent transport systems: the role of integrated socio-
technical aspects of provision, the opportunistic use of contradictory economic arguments serving industrial
agendas, the creation of an apolitical façade around pro-car decision-making, and the ‘capture’ of the state
within the car-dependent transport system. Through uncovering the constituents, processes and characteristics
of car-dependent transport systems, we show that moving past the automobile age will require an overt and
historically aware political program of research and action.
1. Introduction
1.1. The problem
The transport sector is heavily implicated in climate change, ac-
counting for 23% of total energy-related CO2 emissions in 2010 [1].
Since 1970, direct transport-related greenhouse gases (GHG) emis-
sions have risen by 250% worldwide, i.e. “at a faster rate than any
other energy end-use sector” ([1]:606). The majority of current
emissions, and most of the historical increase, are due to road
transport. In developed countries, the second half of the twentieth
century has seen dramatic increases in motorization and distances
travelled, although both of these may now have plateaued. In de-
veloping and emerging economies, motorization and travel distances
are now increasing rapidly, albeit from much lower levels [1–4]. All
IPCC scenarios for 2020–2050 predict further increases in per capita
passenger travel demand for all world regions ([1]:638). With activity
growth likely to continue to outweigh climate mitigation and energy
efficiency actions, transport is one of the most intractable sectors for
the climate agenda.
At the same time transport, like other forms of energy consump-
tion, delivers energy services which are essential for human well-
being and the satisfaction of basic needs [5–13]. World regions are
positioned differently with respect to how transport and car use
contribute to human well-being. In OECD countries, transport GHG
emissions are high and must be radically reduced, but need-satisfac-
tion has come to be dependent on (high levels of) car use [10,14,15].
Car ownership and use can be an essential precondition for social
inclusion in developed countries, notably in suburban and peri-urban
areas which have been built on the assumption of near-universal car
access [16–24]. In developing and emerging countries, motorized
transport use and related emissions are still relatively low. However,
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in many circumstances, increases in motorized transport use and re-
lated energy consumption may be necessary to achieve decent levels
of need-satisfaction [25].
This situation reflects a broader conundrum between mitigating
climate change and ensuring human well-being. In this context, a small
but growing body of research aims at finding ways of reconciling social
and environmental concerns, 'decoupling' human needs satisfaction
from energy use [5,8,25–33], although contributions that focus speci-
fically on transport are still relatively rare [10].
The political-economic factors behind the ‘coupling' of human needs
satisfaction and energy use are likely to be formidable barriers to de-
coupling efforts, and hence climate change mitigation, yet to date they
have drawn only limited attention. In this paper, we identify some of
the main political-economic factors underpinning ‘car-dependent
transport systems’, based on a critical literature review which draws
together research from several fields. We define a car-dependent
transport system as one in which high levels of car use have become a key
satisfier of human needs, largely displacing less carbon-intensive alternatives
[10]. Car-dependent transport systems are an important component of
‘carbon lock-in’, i.e. “the interlocking technological, institutional and
social forces that can create policy inertia towards the mitigation of
global climate change” ([34]:817). Recent studies have suggested that
the magnitude of the financial and techno-institutional barriers to
‘unlocking’ is greater for road passenger transport than for most other
sectors [35].
By focusing on car dependence (as defined here) we deliberately
investigate only some of the factors underpinning the transport-related
carbon requirements of well-being, i.e. those linked to energy demand
and human behavior. This is illustrated below with reference to the





ctivity p km Modal tructure p km p km
Energy ntensity MJ p km uel Carbon Intensity tCO eq MJ
[ · ]· [ · / · ]·
[ / · ]· [ / ]
total modes mode total
mode 2
(1)
In this paper, we will look at the political-economic factors behind
changes in levels of activity (total distances travelled) and modal struc-
ture (the distribution of these distances between different transport
modes). The other two, more technological factors – i.e. the energy in-
tensity of travel modes, and the carbon intensity of the fuels that they use
– are beyond the scope of this review, as their investigation would re-
quire focusing on rather different processes, actors and policy sectors
than those considered here (see e.g. [38–40]). Also, historically changes
in activity and modal structure have been the most important drivers of
trends towards higher GHG emissions. Grübler [41], reviewing 300
years of technology history, singles out transport as the paradigmatic
example of a sector where huge activity growth has negated efficiency
improvements - a pattern that is also visible in the latest available
figures [42].
Our goal with this review paper is to provide a synthesis of ex-
isting research to provide a more comprehensive account of the po-
litical-economic underpinnings of car dependence. A car-dependent
transport system brings together a complex mix of different kinds of
factors, which have been explored under various theoretical and
disciplinary approaches. In this paper, we aim to integrate these
various accounts into a single coherent and holistic description that
gives due consideration to political economy aspects. By investigating
the political-economic root causes of car dependence, we aim to learn
lessons on how to break free from carbon lock-in in the transport
sector.
Overall, the paper makes five contributions. First, it counters the
relative lack of political economy and critical perspectives, in main-
stream transport research, where transport has largely been seen as a
‘technical’ and ‘apolitical’ matter1 [43–45]. The particular approach
within political economy that we draw upon is the ‘systems of provi-
sion’ approach [62–66] as will be discussed in Section 1.2.
Second, and more specifically, the paper extends existing research
on car dependence. The main approaches to the study of car depen-
dence focus on different barriers to modal shift – social attitudes, built
environment, and social practices [67] – but they all generally neglect
the economic and political factors underpinning car-dependent socie-
ties.
Third, and conversely, the nascent literature on the political
economy of energy systems and climate change (e.g. [68,69,46–50])
has not primarily focused on transport to date, perhaps reflecting en-
trenched disciplinary divisions.
Fourth, we bring together insights from several fields that have so
far remained rather disconnected and have not been brought together
from a comprehensive critical research perspective. By highlighting the
connections between them, we aim to encourage greater cross-fertili-
zation between these fields.
Finally, by highlighting the constituent elements of car-dependent
transport systems, this review lays out a theoretical framework which
could inform ongoing research into the energy requirements of well-
being [5,7,13,25,52].
The paper proceeds in Sections 2-6 to characterize the five con-
stituent elements of car dependence, namely: the automotive industry
(Section 2); the provision of car infrastructure (Section 3); the political
economy of car-dependent land-use patterns (Section 4); the provision
of public transport (Section 5); and cultures of consumption of the
automobile (Section 6). Section 7 brings together these different strands
of literature into a single account of the political economy of car de-
pendence. It does this by discussing more systematically the inter-
connections between all the different elements, and how they reinforce
each other. It then discusses deeper underlying mechanisms, to suggest
a structural account that cuts across single elements.
Our review is inevitably selective. Most notably, the paper does not
address directly the political economy of the oil industry even though
cars and oil have a symbiotic relationship that can be traced back to
early twentieth-century US [53,70]. It is worth stressing at the outset
the significance of this relationship. Road transport currently accounts
for 49% of world oil final consumption (up from 31% in 1973) [71] and
the share of oil within total road transport energy is 94% (down from
100% in 1973) [72]. In that sense, any political economy of car de-
pendence is necessarily also a political economy of oil (and vice-versa)
[73]. However, and by the same token, cars and oil are distinct items
that involve distinct, though overlapping, systems of provision. Our aim
in focusing on the car-dependent transport system is to establish a po-
litical-economic basis upon which future work could expand to inter
alia better understand the political economy of oil, building on existing
research in that area (e.g. [74–77]).
1.2. Approach
As each of the areas covered in this review is interdisciplinary and
diverse, it is important to be able to order and make sense of this di-
verse material. For this, we draw on ‘political economy’, which we
understand as the tradition of classical political economists and of those
diverse ‘heterodox’ economists who have developed on the basis of
classical political economy and in some opposition to mainstream
1While this is true for mainstream transport research, there are obviously a
lot of critical perspectives on transport from other disciplinary areas, going
back to the work of Jane Jacobs [54]. There are more contemporary examples
from fields such as history (e.g. [55–57]), urban geography (e.g. [58]), and
political science (e.g. [59]). Research within the ‘new mobilities paradigm’
[60,61] has also developed more critical insights into transport. We will draw
on these perspectives in our review.
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neoclassical economics. Such a broader and more social science or-
ientated approach to economics acknowledges inseparable links be-
tween the economy and political, technological, social, historical and
context-specific dimensions [78].
More specifically, we draw from a particular approach to concrete
analysis developed within the political economy tradition, called the
‘systems of provision approach’ (SoP) [62–66]. Whilst rooted in the un-
derstanding of accumulation developed within the political economy tra-
dition, SoP has been developed to aid concrete research in a way that both
recognizes the social, cultural, technical, as well as economic specificities
of any one provisioning process, whilst at the same time incorporating
understanding of the more general dynamics of capitalism.
Our review is oriented by three key principles of the SoP approach.
First, the adoption of a ‘vertical’ analysis framework i.e. the “idea that
consumption (needs) to be understood more closely in relation to its
attachment to production” ([66]:29) and to be placed “on the broader
terrain of provisioning, where it belongs” ([66]:39). This leads us to
cover automotive industry research in our review – unlike most con-
temporary research on car dependence, which tends to focus on the
consumption and use of motor vehicles [15,21,67], while neglecting the
logics underpinning their supply.
Second, attention for historical developments, as “the prevailing
state of affairs rests heavily on past forms of provision and the way in
which these have informed the continuing evolution of both material
and cultural aspects of provision” ([66]:40).
Third, the inductive selection of the main ‘elements’ of the SoP, with
the aim to “shine a spotlight on (those) that are of particular relevance
to the issue under consideration” ([66]:34), i.e., in our case, the en-
vironmental (un)sustainability of transport.
Overall, the SoP approach allows us to demonstrate how the different
elements underpinning the political economy of car dependence are in-
terlinked, allowing a holistic understanding of how car dependence per-
petuates itself. This approach overlaps with other perspectives high-
lighting the interconnectedness of technological, social, and institutional
factors in energy systems. These include ‘technology clusters’ [41],
‘techno-institutional complexes’ [34], and ‘socio-technical systems’ [79].
Rather than providing a comprehensive systemic account of automobility
as has been attempted using some of these approaches, however, our aim
is to highlight the key political economy factors that underpin car-
dependent transport systems. In doing this, we thread a middle ground
between two positions in sustainable consumption and production re-
search [80]: the ‘revolutionary’ position – entailing a radical critique of
modern capitalist societies, but with an overwhelming focus on deep
structures rather than specific energy sectors – and the ‘reconfiguration’
position – focusing on the transformation of specific socio-technical sys-
tems and daily life practices, but with a tendency to overlook politics and
power. Our approach allows us to identify underlying cross-cutting char-
acteristics of car dependence which we believe will be crucial in devel-
oping an overtly political program to move beyond it.
The focus of the review is not on a specific spatial and temporal con-
text. Rather, we draw from examples from different countries and different
times, in order to illustrate what the main constituent parts of a car-de-
pendent transport system are, and how such situations can arise histori-
cally. Due to the topical range of our review and our research goals, it fits
under the “narrative review” categorization of Sovacool et al. [81]. Our
goal is the achievement of novel in-depth qualitative perspectives on this
topic, consistent with establishing a systemic causal description of the most
important generic elements of the political economy of car dependence.
2. The automotive industry
The growth of the global fleet of light-duty vehicles shows no sign of
slowing down and has even gathered pace since the turn of the century,
passing the 1 billion mark in the 2010s [82,83]. Meanwhile, the global
motorization rate has increased linearly from 20 vehicles per 1000 in-
habitants in 1950 to approximately 143 in 2015 (own elaboration based
on [82–84]). This has been accompanied by almost uninterrupted
growth in levels of passenger car production (Fig. 1)
Based on a selective review of the literature, with a notable focus on
the environmental implications of vehicle manufacturers’ actions, in the
remainder of this section, we identify five key characteristics of the
industry and their implications for car dependence.2 Fig. 2 summarizes
Fig. 1. World passenger car production according to BTS 1961–2015 [93] and OICA 1996–2018 [93]. Note: BTS figures do not include minivans, pickups, and sport
utility vehicles.
2 Over its long history, the automotive industry has obviously undergone
significant change in many respects. In this section, however, we focus on the
‘deep drivers’ that have consistently contributed to increasing levels of car
dependence, and have changed only very little over the course of the last
century [94,95,92,96,86,97,98].
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the elements and the relationships highlighted.
2.1. Scale and economic significance
The first key feature of the automotive industry is its sheer scale and
economic significance. Since its beginnings at the end of the 19th
century, it has grown into one of the main industrial sectors of the
global economy. According to industry estimates, in 2005 it accounted
for a global turnover of €1.9 trillion, higher than the GDP of most na-
tional economies, and for 5% of the world's total manufacturing em-
ployment [99]. In the main car-producing world-regions (North
America, Europe and East Asia) these figures are even higher [87].
The industry also has strong economic linkages to other sectors,
through upstream supply chains to supplier industries (e.g. steel,
rubber, and glass), and to downstream spin-off effects, notably oil
consumption, which magnify its economic importance [59,70,89].
While external suppliers can account for a large share of vehicles’ value
[98,100], here we focus mostly on vehicle manufacturers, given their
key position in the structure of the industry, both in strategic and
economic terms [94].
Mainly as a result of large economies of scale (Section 2.2), the car
market is dominated by relatively few large global multi-brand con-
glomerates, with 67% of global production accounted for by the top ten
manufacturers in 2017 (own elaboration based on [93]). Three of the
world's top twenty businesses by revenue are car manufacturers [101],
providing “the archetypical example of (a) sector dominated by mul-
tinational corporations” ([39]:3).
Historically, car manufacturing has played an important role in the
economic development of early industrialized countries, introducing
productivity-enhancing innovations in technology and labor organiza-
tion that have then spread to other sectors [59]. Current emerging
economies, such as India [102] and Vietnam [103], see the develop-
ment of an automotive sector as a key step forward in industrialization,
because of the high labor productivity and the economic multiplier
effects associated with the industry [2,4,95]. The state typically has a
leading role in promoting efforts to establish the industry in new
countries 59,96,104,88,105,91]. This is part of a broader pattern of
globalization of ‘carbon lock-in’, whereby developing economies pro-
mote “rapid industrialization through the adoption of … development
strategies that have proven successful in industrial countries”
([106]:1188).
2.2. High capital intensity and large economies of scale
Economies of scale are a critically important element shaping the
structure of the automotive industry [94,92,96,98]. Particularly im-
portant here is the all-steel body [94,100,107], which resolved several
production bottlenecks when it was introduced in the 1920s, thereby
allowing mass production. This also, however, required large capital
investments in high-volume plants focused on one or few models
([94]:116). It has also led to a consolidation and centralization of the
industry during the twentieth century into a small number of compa-
nies, with very high barriers to entry for outsiders, and high barriers to
exit, due to sunk investments [92,96,97,98,108].
This has important impacts on the industry's political clout. Large
factories and large, consolidated companies mean that the car industry,
or even specific car plants, can become “too big to fail,” leading gov-
ernments to lend support using public funds, thereby adding political
lock-in not just to the industry itself, but also to a specific configuration
of production. Luger [38] applies the notion of 'state dependence' to
characterize the privileged position of the automotive industry within
capitalist states due to governments’ dependence on the jobs, growth,
and state revenue it provides, arguing that "policymakers often do not
have to be pressured to respond to industry requests because economic
growth and political stability can hinge on a healthy auto industry”
([38]:184–185). For example, at both national and local levels the state
obtains significant revenues from the industry in the form of VAT, taxes
on income and profits, both from manufacturers and others (e.g. deal-
erships, insurance industry). These considerations may inform the de-
cisions of state actors in key policy areas, even in the absence of out-
right lobbying – as discussed in Sections 3 and 4.
Because the structure of the industry makes it ill-suited to cope with
rapid fluctuations in demand, (Section 2.3), its political clout becomes
particularly apparent during economic crises, such as the 2008 financial
crisis and its aftermath. During recessions, car sales plummet, as the
purchase of new cars is one of the first expenses that households cut
[109]. This motivates government attempts to rescue the car industry
through emergency financing, loans, sales incentives, or excise duty
cuts ([96]:165, [89,102]).
These measures are typically not politically controversial, partly
because jobs in the car industry are an important bargaining chip. To
ensure state support, car companies can threaten to relocate production
or invest abroad [38,92]. Car production is concentrated into a few
large plants, with entire regional production systems specialized in car
manufacturing [86,88,110–112]. Therefore, the social impacts of au-
tomotive plant closure or relocation have greater political relevance
and media visibility than for industries whose employment is more
geographically dispersed. This strengthens the bargaining hand of pro-
car interests in all areas where measures can be presented as having a
negative impact on employment in the automotive industry. For similar
reasons, trade unions are likely to side with the car industry in conflicts
over government support, or transport policy [38,40,92].
2.3. Overcapacity and overproduction, with declining profitability, and
focus on multipurpose vehicles
Large economies of scale and capital intensity in the car industry
mean that high levels of production are required to recover incurred
Fig. 2. Key characteristics of the automotive industry and implications for car dependence (own elaboration).
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costs, with break-even points “at about 85 percent capacity utilization”
(of plants) ([96]:146). So, while the dominant technological regime of
car production allows large economies of scale, it also requires high
volumes of production and sales relative to capacity, while the size and
cost of new car plants make it difficult to adjust output to demand [98].
This forces manufacturers to 'push through' as many vehicles as pos-
sible, almost regardless of demand, resulting in price reductions in both
new and used vehicles [83,94,92,96,86,98]. Overproduction has cre-
ated profitability problems for the industry and encouraged a “fire and
forget” attitude towards car sales ([96]:106) which exhibits “in-
difference in systems resources optimization” ([113]:326). Automotive
companies have therefore ignored a potentially profitable, and ulti-
mately more sustainable business model in which car companies would
become ‘mobility service providers,’ capturing downstream revenue
rather than relying on overproduction [94,92,113–115].
The production system described above became locked-in in the
particular conditions of the early stages of motorization [90], “where
demand for any form of low-cost motorization meant that consumers
were willing to accept standardized products” ([86]:231). Later on,
however, saturated car markets in developed countries forced produ-
cers to increasingly compete through product differentiation, with a
proliferation of models, body styles and variants ([96]:25–26;
[108]:20–21), which have become means of class and (sub)cultural
distinction for consumers. This came at considerable cost to the in-
dustry, which had to re-design its production facilities, re-orient its
relationship with its workers, and re-structure itself to give more re-
sources to design and marketing rather than production [116]. It also
further exacerbated the industry's profitability problems, as lower vo-
lumes per variant made it even harder to break even [94]. Therefore, it
has been estimated that typical profit margins were 20–30% in the
1920s, 10% in the 1960s, and lower than 5% in the 2000s
([94]:101–111;[96]:126).
Orsato and Wells [92] argue that to mitigate these profitability
problems, car manufacturers focused on “general-purpose designs that
approximate to several user needs” ([92]:997) as a risk-reduction
strategy, which allows a single type of vehicle to appeal to as wide a
market share as possible. In practice this means that the vast majority of
passenger cars are five-seat vehicles with maximum speeds of over
160 km/h and a fuel range of approximately 400 km ([92]:997; [86]).
Many of the differences used to market them as separate vehicles for
differentiated customer groups are therefore limited to the superficial
level of models, variants and trim choices, while diversity has actually
been reduced at the more important but less visible level of vehicle
platforms and architectures, as a result of strategies such as platform
consolidation, common vehicle architectures and modular assembly
[92,96].
In a nutshell, the industry has sought to combine economies of scale
(via underlying platforms) with brand and model differentiation that
sustain the (illusion of) product variety, while the basic pattern of the
multipurpose, five-passenger vehicle continues to dominate. A more
fundamental challenge to this configuration would require a profound
shakeup in the structure of the car industry — something that car
companies therefore have every incentive to avoid. From a consumer
perspective though, this means that cars have in-built redundancy or
“excess” ([16]:17–18). This in turn leads to the car system as a whole
having a great deal of unused capacity, making it more inefficient from
a financial, spatial, energy, and carbon perspective.
Another important strategy adopted by car manufacturers to
maintain profitability is to expand aggressively into new markets, such
as emerging and developing countries. The rapid growth of car trans-
port systems therein accounts for much of car companies’ present-day
profits [96,108,117]. In short, the industry has been adept at achieving
growth through spatial expansion alongside the deepening of car de-
pendence in those economies that were early adopters of mass car
ownership and use. This shows that there is a spatial-temporal aspect of
the continued prevalence of car dependence.
Overall, the automotive industry provides an excellent sectoral il-
lustration of the self-expanding, spiraling dynamic of value under ca-
pitalism, and of the global ecological challenges that emerge as a by-
product [118]. The research reviewed in this section is also consistent
with Unruh's [34] view that increasing returns to scale are a key driver
of ‘carbon lock-in’: early technological choices which made the industry
highly capital-intensive led to a process in which product technology,
production technology and business structure mutually reinforced each
other and resulted in a high degree of isomorphism and lock-in
[94,95,92,96,86,97]. This lock-in forces the industry to fight tooth and
nail against threats to its established business models, and it therefore
lobbies to water down regulations on issues such as safety and the
environment [16,38,111,119–127]. This suggests that it is the auto-
mobile industry as a whole that should be seen as unsustainable, rather
than specific products or technologies as is often claimed [96,98,115].
2.4. Lock-in mechanisms on the consumer side
The characteristics of the automotive industry described in the
previous sections can be linked to two important lock-in mechanisms on
the consumer side. First, the industry's tendency towards over-
production means that new and used vehicles depreciate rapidly, so
that their owners are unlikely to trade them in even if they no longer
need them. This sunk investment could explain the ‘hysteresis effect’ in
car ownership, whereby households are more likely to acquire a car in
response to a change in life situation than they are to dispose of it when
there is an equivalent change in the opposite direction [128,129]. More
broadly, transport behavior research has demonstrated that “travellers
commit themselves to particular behaviors through the ownership of
cars (as) they trade a large one-off payment for low (…) marginal cost
at the point of use” ([51]:259). This means that the cost of public
transport trips (at least when paid on a pay-as-you-go basis) tends to
compare unfavorably with the perceived marginal cost of an additional
car trip.
Second, the multipurpose nature and surplus capacity of cars has
wider implications for how people relate to them, and can potentially
explain why, once acquired, they tend to dominate individual travel
practices. We discuss this point in more detail in Section 6, along with
other aspects of cultures of consumption.
3. The provision of car infrastructure
Mass production of vehicles tends to be accommodated through the
publicly-funded provision of supportive systems and institutions, in-
cluding paved roads, parking, and the enforcement of driving laws [59].
These elements, which we collectively refer to as ‘car infrastructure’
constitute the public-sector aspects of car-dependent transport systems.
The institutionalization of mass car use within these infrastructures is a
key element of the political economy of car dependence.
In this section, we first highlight the societal distribution of the costs
associated with car infrastructure (Section 3.1), and then focus more
specifically on road infrastructure, discussing both how cars achieve
domination over existing road space (Section 3.2.1), and how road
networks are expanded to accommodate traffic growth (Section 3.2.2).
3.1. The socialization of the costs of car infrastructure
The involvement of the state in the regulation and delivery of
transport systems pre-dates the development of the automobile [130],
and has persisted since then to create a ‘mixed private-public’ system in
which individuals pay for the vehicles themselves, while various public
bodies pay for the infrastructures, institutions, and systems that enable
their use ([131]:26–27).
There are disputes over the nature of these financial flows, and
particularly over whether user fees and other dedicated taxes are
commensurate to the cost of providing car infrastructure [132–134].
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Sustainable transport advocates often argue that car travel benefits
from “hidden subsidies”, as costs are shifted to other sectors or ex-
ternalized, resulting in an underpricing of driving compared to alter-
natives. Free parking and minimum parking requirements are a good
example of this, as they arguably constitute a “hidden tax on [building]
development to subsidize cars” ([135]:16). Differences in the level of
these hidden subsidies might help explain the differences in driving per
capita between the United States versus other OECD countries, al-
though car travel tends to be ‘underpriced’ in most OECD countries
([136]:37).
These hidden subsidies, however, are often so prevalent that they
can seem normal and fair ([136]:46). Parking pricing and supply re-
strictions, for example, are often resisted on the grounds that they harm
local development [137]. The lack of charges for the use of most roads
has long been criticized as inefficient by mainstream economists, who
have proposed various forms of “Pigouvian taxes,” [138] or road pri-
cing, as a solution. These, however, have low public and political ac-
ceptance, and their introduction has been limited to a few large urban
areas [139–143]. Overall, subsidies to car travel, whose costs are spread
among the government and private individuals, are often more politi-
cally defensible than support for public transport, which tends to be
largely publicly funded [136].
Thus, there is a normalized set of political and policy institutions
that spread the costs of driving either among the public at large or
among the motoring public (meaning that low users subsidize high
users). Either way, this is, according to Freund and Martin, “one ex-
pression of how society subsidizes a system of individualized con-
sumption that is highly energy and resource-intensive and is not viable
on a global or a long-term scale” ([16]:1).
3.2. The provision of road infrastructure
Roads are the most important ‘infrastructural counterpart’ to cars.
The use-value of cars is dependent on the existence of a paved road
network that allows fast and safe travel to destinations of interest.
Historically, this is achieved by appropriating existing road space for
car use, as well as through the provision of additional road space.
3.2.1. The appropriation of road space for car use
Historically, roads were used by a variety of transport modes in-
cluding walking, horse-drawn vehicles, trams and bicycles. Increasing
motorization, however, led to conflicts over road space between mo-
torists and these pre-existing road users, typically entangled with de-
bates around safety, congestion and modernity [144,145]. A critical
element of any car system is the resolution of these conflicts, through
regulation and reconstruction of roads to give priority to motorists.
Norton's [146] account of the history of the American street is a good
illustration of how this occurs. Initially, the introduction of cars onto
American streets led to a rash of casualties from collisions, and sub-
sequent calls for stricter regulation of motorists. Motorists and car
companies, however, gained enough influence over policy and public
discourse to re-frame the problem, so that the solution was to remove
pedestrians and other road users from the path of motor vehicles. The
outcome of this conflict was thus a 'social reconstruction' of city streets
as "chiefly motor thoroughfares, open to others only under carefully
defined restrictions” ([146]:333).
A parallel process of ‘physical reconstruction’ of city streets further
entrenched the domination of the car over road space. The decades-long
development of 'pedestrian infrastructure' (such as zebra crossings,
street crossing signals, and pedestrian subways) had the double goal of
"making roads safe for pedestrians" while "keeping them out of the way"
of motor vehicles and thus allowing faster traffic flow [147]. Often, the
second goal appears to have prevailed, as these measures were some-
times developed ad hoc and in the absence of evidence of their impact
on pedestrian safety – and there is in fact evidence to suggest that
systems like pedestrian railings can have a negative impact on
pedestrian safety [148]. Over time, such elements of street design and
traffic regulation have become entrenched and spread globally
[149,150]. This complex of infrastructure and regulation can result in a
situation where walking, while ‘protected’ from traffic, is slowed down
and made inconvenient [151].
Effectively, the twin processes of social and physical reconstruction
transform roads from a commons, accessible to everyone, to a space
reserved to car users, making a car a critically important need satisfier
while also limiting the ability of other transport modes to satisfy peo-
ple's needs.
Historically modes alternative to the car, regardless of their popu-
larity, were similarly marginalized to make room for them. Tram net-
works offered a ubiquitous and accessible form of travel [152] but were
often removed and replaced with motor buses, partly on the grounds
that they were to blame for congestion [153,154]. Cyclists were mar-
ginalized based on similar arguments which positioned them as dan-
gerous and obstructive to motor traffic [155,156]. Many countries in
the Global South are today moving in a similar direction of excluding
non-motorized transport, such as cycles and rickshaws, from their roads
[4,157–159]. In both developed and developing countries, these pro-
cesses have been justified, not on the grounds that cars outnumber al-
ternative modes (typically they claim road space well before this hap-
pens), but claiming that cars are inherently modern, progressive, and
inevitable (see Section 5).
The assumption that cars should have priority access to road space
has persisted into the present day and continues to make the use of
alternative modes more difficult [147,154,160]. In this context, pro-
moting the use of alternative modes of transport requires taking space
back from cars [23,161] – a process which can encounter public and
political opposition [112], because of the common (but usually erro-
neous) assumption that these projects will increase congestion [162].
Efforts to sustain the dominance of the car over road space are also
clearly visible in recent controversies over whether electric kick scoo-
ters should be allowed to ride on the road, and whether the introduc-
tion of autonomous vehicles should require further limitations being
placed on pedestrians and other transport modes.
3.2.2. The provision of additional road space
Beyond encroaching on existing road space, growing motorization is
intertwined with the provision of additional road space. Road building
typically requires large, expensive, state-funded projects [59,91], and
thus considerable political justification and legitimization. We argue
that five typical ‘strategies of legitimization’ [163,164] can be identi-
fied (Table 1). The first of these includes two apparently contradictory
appeals to economic growth. First, the necessity for road building can be
presented as arising from economic growth, as more economic activity
means more car ownership and use, in turn leading to additional road
space requirements. This translates to a neoclassical view of demand-
driven welfare and utility expansion. The second variant sees road
building as being required for economic growth, despite the weak em-
pirical evidence on this relationship [165–168]. In economic terms, this
is a Keynesian argument of infrastructure and public investment sti-
mulus.
Over time, the emphasis can shift between the ‘roads to accom-
modate growth’ and ‘roads to kick-start growth’ variants, depending on
the economic climate [169–171]. These arguments are extremely ef-
fective, as they justify road building under any circumstances, and in-
voke economic growth, which is routinely considered a political im-
perative.3 As Reardon and Marsden [167] argue, linking economic
3 It should be noted that although economic growth is still routinely held up
as the ultimate metric of progress, its high-level critics have severely under-
mined this claim, by exposing the links between growth, inequality and en-
vironmental damage, as well as lack of connection to well-being and social
benefits [176–179].
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growth, growing travel demand and road-building also tends to result
in the ‘discursive depoliticization’ of transport policy.
The second strategy appeals to ‘popular consumerism’, which sees
growing consumption by the public as inherently positive and worthy
of encouragement [172]. This argument assumes that increasing car use
reflects ‘consumer preferences’ and thus deserves to be provided for with
additional dedicated infrastructure. This fits well with perceived elec-
toral benefits of providing “a consumer-minded public with the public
investment to meet their private needs” ([172]:99). This framing of
automobility as an expression of healthy individualism can be parti-
cularly useful to justify public investment in road building in in-
dividualistic political cultures, such as American conservatism, which
are traditionally averse to public interventionism [173].
A third justification is based on the idea that roads assist with re-
gional development and the reduction of spatial economic inequalities,
by facilitating economic growth in the regions in which they are built.
The post-war British Labor Party, depression-era American govern-
ments, developing-world governments, and the EU have all used road-
building in an alleged attempt to address spatial economic inequalities
[79,172,174,175].
The combination of this more left-wing justification with the more
right-wing appeal to popular consumerism is particularly powerful, as it
means that road-building can be justified from across the political
spectrum, and is thus easy to present as an obvious policy choice that
has “transcended party differences, and instead (serves) the general
national interest” ([172]:99). Road building and maintenance can thus
come to be seen as a matter of basic political common sense, and a
neutral indication of policymakers’ competence [144]. This means that
many of the justifications for road building discussed here, despite
being firmly in the repertories of the ‘road lobby’ (as discussed below),
often do not even need to be voiced.
A fourth strategy of legitimization presents road building as the main
solution to the problems generated by increasing motorization [172]. Here it
is argued that new (and ‘better’) roads will reduce congestion (by
providing the necessary space for handling traffic ‘flows’) and improve
safety (through the segregation of different types of traffic, e.g. long-
distance and local). Again, there is an element of circularity here, as
greater road provision can result in increased traffic, through the me-
chanism of ‘induced demand’ [180–187]. The resulting feedback loop –
whereby more roads create more traffic, which in turn leads to calls for
further road building – has been identified as a key driver of the self-
reinforcing dynamic of car dependence [23,61,188,189]. This ulti-
mately results in the exacerbation of the congestion and safety pro-
blems that road building was supposed to solve.
A final legitimization strategy is based on technical expertise: road
network expansions are officially sanctioned to be in the general public
interests (on a scheme-by-scheme basis) by experts applying appraisal
methods that are considered to be objective and scientific [57]. Tra-
ditional transport planning approaches [3,16,23,149,153,190,191] and
mainstream economics methods of appraisal such as Cost-Benefit
Analysis often have a bias towards road building, for example when
they disregard or underestimate induced demand, or privilege motor-
ists’ travel time savings over environmental impacts and accessibility
for all road users [9,185,192–199]. In practice, though, these ap-
proaches and methods are often used to confer legitimacy to transport
decision-making (on grounds of scientificity and neutrality), even when
the decisions are taken mostly on other grounds [43,44,172,200]. This
has become increasingly entrenched as the process of motorization has
gained momentum, resulting in the establishment of relevant knowl-
edge communities.
While various strategies are used to legitimize road building, certain
economic interests stand to benefit from these developments either
directly (from road building per se) or indirectly (from greater levels of
car ownership and use). These economic actors, often referred to col-
lectively as the ‘road lobby’, can lend a powerful voice behind the ar-
guments discussed above. It has been suggested that countries that
undertook particularly large road building programs, such as Germany
and the US, owe this to the power of the local road lobby
([169]:169–170;[73]).
The road lobby can be defined as a "network of vested interests"
bringing together the automotive, oil, road haulage, road construction,
concrete, steel, insurance, and other industries, as well as motoring
clubs [120]. It can act through formal advocacy groups, representing
the alliance between different businesses and trade associations, and
can influence policy by directly lobbying policymakers (which is often
easy due to the fact that transport is typically not a major national
election issue), or by shaping public opinion through media campaigns
and the mobilization of political support [73,120,172]. While these are
all important channels of influence, it must be kept in mind that gov-
ernments’ inclination towards road building might also result from the
objective situation of ‘state dependence’ [38] towards the car industry
(and other related industries), as discussed in Section 2.2.
A key goal of the road lobby is to ensure that road expenditures are
insulated from competition with other spending priorities, as well as
from political scrutiny and the consequences of alternation of different
parties in power [38,120,172]. This can happen when governments, for
a range of reasons, earmark funds or adopt investment appraisal and
decision-making procedures that are biased towards road building. In
these conditions, outright lobbying may even no longer be necessary, as
road building gains momentum and becomes entrenched into the
workings of government.
Despite the formidable material and symbolic forces mobilized in its
support, road building eventually encounters three related kinds of
constraints [153,172]: (i) financial constraints, as it comes into conflict
with other areas of public expenditure; (ii) physical constraints, due to
the need to reclaim land from other uses, which is particularly pro-
blematic in urban areas; (iii) constraints related to public and political
acceptability. These can arise from opposition to the substitution of
previous land uses, severance and ‘visual intrusion’, as well as from
concerns for environmental and safety impacts.
Table 1
Main strategies of legitimization for road building.
Strategy Variant Summary Application & purpose
1a - Appeal to economic growth Neoclassical ‘road building is necessary to accommodate economic
growth’
Used in times of economic growth
1b - Appeal to economic growth Keynesian ‘road building is required to stimulate economic growth’ Used in times of economic crisis
2 - Appeal to popular consumerism – ‘car infrastructure is required by consumer preferences’ Appeals to the political right
3 - Road building as a means to regional
development and social inclusion
– ‘car infrastructure is required for region X to grow and
‘catch up’ with the rest of the country’, or to facilitate social
inclusion
Appeals to the political left
4 - Road building as a solution to the problems
caused by increasing motorization
– ‘the answer to current transport problems is road building’ Fuels self-reinforcing cycle of road building,
traffic growth and congestion, through induced
demand
5 - Appeal to technical expertise – ‘road building is sanctioned to be in the public interest’ Removes road building from public/political
debate
G. Mattioli, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 66 (2020) 101486
7
Eventually, the push to road and motorway development becomes a
victim of its own success, creating forms of resistance and counter-
action, although this will obviously vary across contexts. This kind of
opposition spawned a major movement in the form e.g. of North
American “freeway revolts,” and British anti-motorway protests, that
occurred from the 1970s through the 1990s [59,201–203]. On the other
hand, it is possible that at some point existing roads require a schedule
of maintenance that is large enough to 'keep busy' at least some of the
vested interests behind road building,4 including perhaps also the au-
tomotive industry (as the 'natural' replacement of huge car fleets in
developed countries still accounts for a large share of their production).
4. The political economy of car-dependent land use patterns
A large body of research in urban planning and transport studies in-
vestigates the relationship between land use patterns and travel behavior,
showing that factors like low population and building density, low street
connectivity, and monofunctional land use result in greater levels of car
use [206]. In this context, car ownership plays a key mediating role, i.e.
car-dependent land use patterns tend to result in greater vehicle owner-
ship, which in turn induces greater car mileage [207].
Historically, increases in motorization in the 20th century have gone
hand-in-hand with significant changes in land-use patterns, creating car-
dependent low-density settlement patterns, referred to as ‘urban sprawl’
[208], which in turn have resulted in greater need for vehicle ownership
and use. While this broad trend has been more pronounced in ‘new-world’
English-speaking countries such as the United States, Canada, and Aus-
tralia, it is common to most developed countries [208–213]. More recently
it has extended to emerging economies [4,214], although it is unlikely that
they will ever reach the same extremes [3].
Much existing research presents sprawl as the unintentional outcome
of market and policy ‘distortions’, and of deficient spatial planning (e.g.
[23,215]), rather than considering its political-economic drivers. There are
exceptions to this, however. Gonzalez [73,122,216,204] adopts an eco-
Marxist perspective to explain the rise of urban sprawl in the US, por-
traying it as the result of a Federal Housing Administration bias, starting in
the 1930s, towards the financing of spacious single-family suburban
houses rather than city cores. This arguably started as a stimulus policy
during the Great Depression, as low-density suburban development
boosted demand for automobiles, consumer durables, and energy con-
sumption, thereby absorbing overproduction from some of the biggest
American industries at the time, crucially including the oil industry. It thus
fitted with the needs of producer groups and real-estate interests involved
with the Federal Housing Administration. Thus, from an eco-Marxist
perspective, the increased consumer demand and environmental in-
efficiency associated with car-dependent land-use patterns is a feature, not
a bug. In the second half of the 20th century, a range of economic interests
“came to rely on the sprawled urban form to create and expand markets
for their products” ([122]:345) and US suburbanization played a key role
for global economic growth, as well as in pushing up global oil demand
[73].
Logemann [217] comes to a similar conclusion, arguing that the tax
credits and government loans used in the US to encourage sub-
urbanization can be construed as a form of ‘hidden welfare state’ [218]
typical of the American economic model, which uses indirect public
spending to encourage private consumption (e.g. home-ownership, car
ownership), rather than providing goods and services publicly. This
model of state intervention tends to mask “the extent to which gov-
ernment spending … actually (contributes) to private consumer afflu-
ences” ([217]:37). In the case of suburbanization, it also obscures the
extent to which sprawl is encouraged by the state, rather than simply
being the aggregate outcome of the ‘preferences’ of rational, self-in-
terested individuals. Similar ‘hidden subsidies’ to car-dependent sub-
urban development have also been documented in Australia [3,219],
France [220] and Germany [211,221–223].
Another important feature of Anglo-American suburbanization is
how it tends to create political support for car dependence. Walks [224]
reviews research documenting the divergence in political preferences
between right-leaning suburban areas and left-leaning central cities
since the 1950–1970s. He argues that, while part of this trend is ex-
plained by a ‘self-selection’ processes (whereby e.g. conservative voters
selectively moved to suburban areas that better reflected their tastes),
there is also an important ‘conversion effect,’ due to the alignment of
suburban lifestyles with privatized consumption, which results in sub-
urbanites’ support for private market solutions ([224]:204). In short,
Walks argues that “automobility and the experience of driving help
reproduce an ethos of individualism, self-reliance and competition”
([224]:204). This can be seen in local political debates in e.g. London
[58], Toronto [112] and San Francisco [225], where suburban car-de-
pendent areas have supported of policies that reduce subsidies to public
transport, maintain the ‘hidden welfare state’ supporting sprawl and
automobility, and preserve the car's domination of street space. Con-
versely, for instance, the German middle classes comparatively greater
willingness to support public spending for urban public goods (in-
cluding public transport) is partly explained by their relative con-
centration in metropolitan cores, where they directly benefitted from
the provision of such goods ([217]:180). Thus, according to Walks’
‘conversion hypothesis’ [224], urban sprawl is the means through
which “automobility generates political demands for policies and pro-
grams that promote and enhance the system at the expense of compe-
titors” ([224]:199). This highlights a political feedback loop within the
self-reinforcing dynamic of car-dependent transport systems.
Most of the literature reviewed in this section focuses on the Anglo-
American world, as these are the countries where sprawl first emerged
and are still the most extreme in this respect. While hidden subsidies
aimed at stimulating private consumption may well be a common
driver of urban sprawl across countries, scholars of suburbanization
caution against generalizing features of the Anglo-American suburban
model to other world regions and have shown the diversity of e.g.
continental European suburbs [226] and ‘postcolonial suburbs’ in
African cities [227]. It is, therefore, possible that the political economy
drivers of car-dependent land-use patterns will vary accordingly -
something that only empirical research can shed light on.
5. The provision of public transport
Growth in car ownership and use is typically accompanied by the
declining use of alternative transport modes. While walking and cycling
are the lowest carbon modes, their usefulness has historically been di-
minished by changes in road space allocation (Section 3) and by the
expansion of activity spaces resulting from urban de-densification
(Section 4). Motorized public transport can, at least in principle, com-
pete with the car on distances beyond walking and cycling range, while
emitting less carbon, due to higher vehicle occupancy rates.5
Given the relationship between the built environment and car de-
pendence (Section 4), it is often assumed that public transport provision
is not ‘viable’ below certain levels of density ([153]:29–32). While there
is some truth to this argument, it tends to obscure the important
4 For example, Wiedenhofer et al. [205] found that approximately half of the
resource requirements for residential buildings and transport networks in the
EU25 could be explained through maintenance of existing stocks.
5 The scope of our discussion in this section is limited to ‘traditional’ public
transport, e.g. we do not consider services such as car sharing. This is for two
reasons: first, while they have drawn much research attention, their penetration
remains very limited and concentrated in large urban areas which are already
less car dependent [232]. Second, the benefits of car sharing in terms of reduced
private car ownership, use, and related emissions are the subject of ongoing
debate (see, e.g. [233–235]).
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political economy dimension of public transport provision which, in
turn, can explain why city-regions with similar density levels can vary
considerably in terms of public transport performance.
While it is straightforward to provide convenient public transport
where the urban fabric pre-dates the motor era, the spatial diffusion of
residences and activities puts traditional ‘radial’ public transport net-
works at a disadvantage [236,237]. Competitive public transport ser-
vices can still be provided, but require an increased coordination effort
through a ‘network planning approach’, characterized by the following
elements [153,236,238–242,228,229]: ‘supply-based’ service provision
and extensive coverage; integration of different modes within a broader
hierarchical network; high frequency or timed-transfer ‘pulse’ time-
tables; integrated fares and ticketing.
These elements enable the reaping of economies of scope and ‘net-
work effects’, whereby the appeal, patronage and revenue of a public
transport link are magnified by the existence of other links in the net-
work [153]. In lower-density areas, due to the dispersion of origins and
destinations, the natural monopoly nature of public transport and the
magnitude of network effects are even stronger.
While public transport systems designed according to the network
approach are associated with higher use [237,238], in practice they can
coexist with high (and unsustainable) levels of car use. They do how-
ever provide levels of service potentially allowing the satisfaction of
basic needs with lower energy and environmental impact, which is
helpful from a resilience and low-carbon transition perspective while
making it easier to build consensus for car restraint measures
([153]:142;[230]).
Not all models of public transport provision are equally suited to
network planning though. Public transport systems are sometimes
presented as on a spectrum between central planning and free-market
provision [236,231]. However, ‘free market’ forms are in fact planned,
created and maintained (for example via regulatory bodies) by the state
[64,243] so that in practice public transport systems all have a mix of
state and private involvement (Table 2). Mees [153] argues that public
oversight of strategic and tactical functions, and jurisdiction over the
whole functional region are necessary (though not sufficient) condi-
tions for adequate planning of an integrated network of services, while
private companies can be involved at the operational level – a position
that is supported within the literature [236,237,242,228,244]. Ac-
cording to this perspective, deregulated (and to some extent fran-
chising) systems will struggle to provide public transport that is com-
petitive with car travel, notably in lower-density areas.
The main reason for this is that providing high standards on the
entire public transport network requires cross-subsidies between dif-
ferent modes, routes and operations, and hence the pooling of revenues,
and there is no incentive for operators to do so in a competitive market
([153]:152–153). Also, deregulated competition results in ‘fragmenta-
tion effects’ such as poor interconnections between services and lack of
inter-ticketing, which can be seen as forms of market failure [144].
In the Global North, public transport has alternated between public
and private ownership since the 19th century. While there has been a
trend towards deregulation and private sector involvement since the
1980s, development has been highly variegated and uneven across
countries and regions ([153]:70–71;[236,245]).
No country has gone further in this respect than Great Britain, where
local bus transport (outside of London) was deregulated and privatized in
the 1980s, in the belief that competition between a multitude of small
operators would improve provision [169,246,247]. Yet the consolidation
that quickly followed deregulation rapidly led to the market being domi-
nated by few large operators, which effectively act as monopolists in many
local areas. There are now strong barriers to market entry, as the ‘big
players’ benefit from the economies of scale inherent to local public
transport [245]. While they do not cross-subsidize routes that are socially
necessary (but unprofitable), they use cross-subsidies to prevent the entry
of new competitors [247]. Since the 1980s, and despite the shrinking size
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through the acquisition of competitors, company restructuring, asset di-
vestment and, increasingly, ventures abroad [247], all the while benefit-
ting from substantial public subsidy [153].
Overall, bus deregulation in Great Britain has been linked to large
fare increases and a strong decline in passenger numbers ([169]:90–95;
[248,249];), with associated impacts in terms of fragmentation of ser-
vices [153,244], increased car dependence and transport-related social
exclusion [246,250,251]. Attempts to re-regulate the market have been
fiercely opposed by the private operators, as their profits in a deregu-
lated environment are much higher than e.g. in a tendering system
[246,247,252]. This suggests that privatization and deregulation, once
enacted, are to some extent locked-in by the fact that ‘incumbents’
lobby against reforms that would threaten the status quo.
While instructive, the British case remains quite unique in the
Global North, where “private players generally continue to operate
under the coordination of regional transit agencies and have a role in
service delivery rather than in configuring the network” ([236]:224).
However, similar deregulation reforms have been implemented at the
local level in other countries. In the late 1980s, for example, Auckland
(New Zealand) deregulated bus services on the British model, resulting
in broadly similar dysfunction, which led to partial re-regulation in
2009 [153,253–255].
In contrast, it has been argued that the model of Verkerhrsverbunde
(VVs), common in German-speaking countries, is ideal to achieve
multimodal network planning in contexts where several public and
private actors are involved in public transport provision
[153,237,256,257]. VVs are regional associations that coordinate
public transport provision over a city-region, integrating operators and
local governments in ‘cooperative planning’. Originally developed to
counter the deleterious effects of uncoordinated competition in 1960s
Hamburg, this model has since been adopted in several European city-
regions, with positive effects in terms of increased public transport use
and reduced car dependence [237,256].
At the heart of the VV model is the idea of ‘cooperative competi-
tion’, in which “businesses emphasize cooperation with their competi-
tors as a means to greater success” ([256]:45), as network effects
benefit all participants in terms of greater patronage and revenue. VVs
generally require higher public subsidies than deregulated systems,
although the differences are not dramatic [237,258,259]. In Germany,
VVs are often cross-subsidized using the revenue of more profitable
municipal utilities such as electricity [256,258]. Cross-subsidies be-
tween different routes and operations are essential to VVs, as revenues
are distributed through a single coordinating institution, in a way that
is “at odds with the principle of market initiative” ([260]:36).
In the Global South, public transport provision is generally closer to
the ‘free market’ end of the spectrum ([153]:75), whereby “a large number
of providers compete in a deregulated market, operating individual ve-
hicles, lines, or on-demand transportation services … with no necessary
consideration for broader network context” ([236]:224) and high levels of
‘informal’ provision [261]. This is often the result of the historical tran-
sition from state-led development to ‘roll-back’ neoliberalism (through
structural adjustment policies), with the associated shift frommonopolistic
state-owned public transport to privatization [262]. The resulting public
transport systems are characterized by abundant supply, but also poor
integration, as well as safety and congestion problems, and this in a period
of increasing private motorization. While there is a consensus around the
need for integrated, hierarchical public transport networks in developing
cities, these are hard to implement due to state weakness and resistance
from current operators [4,262,263]. As incomes rise and urban densities
decrease, the poorly integrated systems of Global South cities may find it
difficult to compete with rising car ownership.
6. Cultures of consumption: the ‘car culture’
The cultural institutions that have coalesced around the private car,
giving it iconic status across the globe, are fundamental to the car-
dependent transport system, and tightly interwoven with all other ele-
ments of the system [59]. These institutions exert a profound influence on
people's choices and behaviors, for example in many cases encouraging
them to choose to travel by car even if there are other options available,
and indeed even if these options might be superior in terms of price,
convenience, or societal and environmental impact. This means, inter alia,
that many motorists continue to drive cars despite living in cities with
functioning public transit systems, walkable streets, or networks of cycle
lanes. It also creates another set of political obstacles that obstruct efforts
to provide alternatives to car use, which tend to get stronger the more
dominant car use is in a given location. It is, therefore, necessary to con-
sider carefully these institutions of ‘car culture’, in order to achieve an
integrated understanding of the car-dependent transport system.
The word “culture” is notoriously ill-defined [264]. For the purposes
of this discussion, we understand culture as having two components.
Firstly, it encompasses the things people do: Patterns in individual be-
havior that recur as a matter of habit, practice, routine, or tradition.
While these patterns of everyday life have a relationship with material
factors, such as car infrastructure and the capital structure of the au-
tomotive industry, they also have their own inertia. The second aspect
of culture encompasses the things that people say, write, and believe
about their own activities and the wider social context of those activ-
ities. This includes powerful discourses of gender, nationality, or the
good life, which people aspire to live up to in their everyday lives, and
also shape how people engage with wider social structures, through
either political or commercial decisions. This section discusses each of
these components of car cultures in turn.
The cultural underpinnings of car dependence go beyond just car
travel and are connected to the very idea of travel as an intrinsically
desirable practice. Prior to modern travel infrastructures such as rail-
ways and highways, most people did not travel very much at all. The
development of railways, however, created a clear economic incentive
to encourage people to travel more. This led the nascent railway in-
dustry to develop new practices of tourism, as it encouraged people to
travel more, to access railway-run resorts [265,266]. The development
of the automobile further increased this tendency, leading to the de-
velopment of new forms of tourism, such as bus and car touring
[267,268]. These developments connected with cultural trends in many
wealthy countries during the 1920s and 1930s, which prized self-re-
liance, adventure, and domestic travel as an act of patriotism. As such,
the narratives and behaviors that currently entrench the centrality of
the car in everyday life initially emerged in opposition to everyday life,
as the early car enjoyed a public reputation as an adventure machine.
Travelling to new places by car became not only a reason for people to
own cars and to drive them more often but also a justification for
building new roads and tourist amenities in places of natural beauty,
leading to the car-centric development of many areas, which had been
more sparsely populated to that point. The practice of “auto camping”
was a prominent outcome of these developments in the United States,
and it led not just to new patterns of travel, but also to an entirely new
form of travel infrastructure in the form of motels [269]. Torrie's [270]
numerical analysis of the history of Canadian automobility finds that
Canadians radically increased the total distance they travelled during
the 1920s and 1930s: cars did not just enable existing mobility needs to
be satisfied in a new way; they created entirely new travel patterns
which were not necessary before. Today, driving—even if there is no
particular destination in mind—remains a common way for people to
“escape” from their everyday lives [271]. Cars are a critical part of the
frictionless mobility that has come to be an important part of social
privilege [272], integrated into people's lives in diverse ways [273].
There is also a distinct temporal aspect of car dependence in ev-
eryday life. Shove [274,275] shows how the temporal flexibility in-
herent to private car use contributes to a fragmentation of the socio-
temporal order, i.e. a decline in collective modes of socio-temporal
coordination, with a corresponding rise in personalized scheduling
practices. In this context, the car as a ‘convenience’ device enables
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temporal co-ordination, while also contributing to further loosening of
collective schedules, which in turn increases the reliance on cars for co-
ordination, in a self-reinforcing process. The end result is an en-
trenchment of the need for cars to juggle the complex temporal or-
dering of ‘modern life’ – as illustrated by the perceived car dependence
of commuters with flexible working schedules [276].
Jarvis [277–279] observes that cars can play an important role in
the time-scapes of everyday life, as people, under increased pressure
from the demands of work, home, and caring for children, will often
“buy time” through the use of private vehicles. These kinds of con-
straints, combined with the sorts of amenities that many people expect
to have available in their lives (such as good schools, or houses with
backyards) can force people to live in places that they might not
otherwise choose, and which are not accessible without driving.
Once a vehicle is purchased, furthermore, it suddenly opens up a
whole range of possible uses, including long-distance travel, the
transport of bulky objects, and the adoption of new car-dependent
leisure practices [67,280,281]. This helps explain why car ownership is
a strong predictor of car use (e.g. [51,207,282]). Acquiring a car has a
very strong transformative effect on individuals’ travel behaviors and
thought patterns, making motorists reluctant to switch to alternative
modes of transport once a car has been acquired. This is closely con-
nected to the multipurpose nature and surplus capacity of cars, as
discussed in Section 2.
Car dependence is thus propped up by a “coercive flexibility”: the
automobile affords great flexibility of movement and temporal co-
ordination, but it also requires it, causing motorists to reshape their
lives, their obligations, and their expectations around it [61]. This
points to an ‘elective affinity’ and a recursive relationship between
social modernization and car use growth [283].
The role of the car in people's everyday lives can also reach beyond
mobility, as narrowly defined. Wells and Xenias [284] argue that, in an
initial phase, cars were valued as a rapid means of transport, but also as
cultural signifiers of ‘freedom’, independent travel and class distinction (as
discussed below). However, motorization growth and associated effects
(e.g. congestion) tend to erode these functional and symbolic qualities. As
a result, the cultural role of the car shifts towards that of a personal space
providing protection from a hostile outside environment (in terms of
crime, weather, road-traffic safety, encounters with strangers and, para-
doxically, air pollution) and ‘cocooning’ (through e.g. insulation and in-car
entertainment systems). Many car users are reluctant to switch to alter-
natives because they enjoy the private space of the car and its affordances,
while they feel anxious and vulnerable in public space [15,276,285–294].
The role of cars as a guarantor of safety has its own positive feedback
mechanism attached to it, as increasing numbers of cars on the road create
more pressure for people to drive cars themselves to protect themselves or
their children from traffic danger [295].
These perceptions are actively encouraged by industrial strategies
promoting safety and cocooning technologies as selling points, and
have two important implications: (i) they provide an alternative source
of use-value for cars in saturated and congested contexts; (ii) they give
cars an edge over alternative modes (e.g. public transport), which are
perceived to compare negatively on these attributes [284].
In addition to this practical functionality that cars have for the ev-
eryday lives of their users, they also have important symbolic and dis-
cursive functionalities, not only for individual drivers but also for society
as a whole. On the most basic level, car use influences how motorists think
about transport, inducing a psychological bias towards more car travel,
and an aversion to alternatives. Studies of how drivers think and talk
about, and behave towards their cars, and how they consider alternative
modes of transport, reveal an additional form of lock-in in the entrenched
attitudes and patterns of thought that predispose them to prefer car travel
over alternatives. This can affect motorists’ mental maps of urban en-
vironments [296]; their unconscious habits [51,297–299]; and the em-
beddedness of the car in everyday practices [21,67,274,276,300,301].
Focus group studies consistently show the discursive bias that motorists
exhibit towards car use [291,302–304]. When talking about driving,
motorists focus on perceived benefits, such as convenience and comfort,
portraying these as immediate, undeniable, and conferring a massive ad-
vantage over alternatives. Downsides such as congestion, limited parking,
and environmental damage, meanwhile, are seen as distant, theoretical,
and ultimately negotiable.
These latent predispositions towards car use are also propped up by
a more conscious emotional affinity for driving [291,294], sometimes
based on incidental elements of car travel, such as weather, road sur-
face and the unique sonic environment provided by the vehicle
[271,285,305]. This provides a powerful emotional and psychological
attachment to driving, which alternative transport struggles to compete
with. When consciously acknowledged, these emotional affinities can
be projected outwards, causing car use to become associated with
various aspects of individual or collective identity. Cars, for example,
have been domesticated as ways of expressing individuality and escape
from monotony among some working-class Scandinavian communities;
while among Aboriginal Australians, they are symbols of group lea-
dership. While the specific symbolic meaning of the automobile varies
by culture, cars are routinely identified as masculine; and as indicators
of class and status [273]. This can create a strong inducement in favor
of car ownership even for people who neither want nor particularly
need a car, as to not own one results in a loss of social status.
These affinities for car travel are complemented by macro-level cul-
tural ‘repertoires’ or ‘ideographs’ [306,307]. The power of these kinds of
macro-discourses about technologies, or “techno-tales” [266,308] is well-
demonstrated and is not unique to the car [265], but the history of the
automobile shows that they played a particularly important role in the
move towards automobility. As road transport became more prevalent,
popular techno-tales began positioning it as superior to pre-existing al-
ternatives, such as railways and tramways. Streetcar companies in the
United States, for example, had a widespread reputation as abusive
monopolists. This meant that buses had a unique appeal as a political
weapon to progressive politicians in the 1920s and 1930s [309], with a
similar phenomenon affecting the intercity railways [144,310]. These
oppositional techno-tales gave road transport an early edge and began to
associate it with freedom, independence from monopoly, and pro-
gressivism while positioning both cars and car-centric infrastructure as a
progressive, modern technology [59,173,267,268,311]. These discourses,
combined with ideas of national pride and national affirmation and public
concerns about the role of road infrastructure in national defense, played a
key role in supporting the construction of early motorways
[268,144,172,173,312–315].
While these justifications were particularly important in the his-
torical establishment of the road transport system and the political
norms that facilitate its continuation, they became less important in
later phases, when motorization reached saturation and cars and mo-
torways came to be seen as a kind of mundane necessity for which there
is no alternative [144]. Utopian techno-tales gave way to more stable
public discourses. A new, defensive variety of pro-car discourses
emerged, portraying road transport as the only credible system or as an
expression of freedom, and portraying its opponents as either clueless
hippies or tyrannical authoritarians [59,53,144].
Deep notions of class can also become entangled with cars; an asso-
ciation deliberately cultivated not just in marketing materials, but in the
design of the cars themselves [116]. Cars are also associated with pro-
minent ideas about gender, a factor that contributed to the desires of men
to own cars [316], but also encouraged car dependence among women, as
driving became a symbol of women's increasing independence during the
early twentieth century [317,318]. Class distinction is a particularly no-
torious example of a cultural trend that supported motorization. Gartman's
[116] historical survey of different cultural logics of automobility de-
scribes varying roles that cars have benefited from cultures of class dis-
tinction. In the modern era of proliferating postmodern subcultures, dif-
ferent patterns of cars (pickup trucks vs. convertibles vs. SUVs) can be an
expression of a subcultural identity. This, however, has an unintended
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consequence for the car industry, as the multiplication of different makes
and models tends to erode economies of scale and profit margins for the
car industry (as discussed in Section 2). This illustrates how the cultural
dynamics of consumption are a key element to explain the trajectory of
automotive production.
The personal habits and cultural narratives underpinning car culture
are both connected to the wider structures of car dependence discussed in
this paper. The habits and practices of everyday life, for example, are
shaped by infrastructural investments, while the political power wielded
by car companies can be used to shape the symbolic value of cars in ways
that benefit them. Car culture, however, has an inertia of its own: Even if
car companies stopped advertising cars and lobbying for car-centric in-
frastructure, people would still retain the preferences and lifestyles that
encourage and in some cases necessitate car use. These cultural aspects of
car dependence, furthermore feedback into the other aspects of car de-
pendence. The high cultural status of driving, for example, establishes
motorists as an important political bloc, with predictable impacts on car
infrastructure and public transit provision. Thus, car culture is not a mere
ephemeral or emergent quality of car dependence: it is one of the key
driving forces that continues to entrench it.
7. Synthesis: interconnections and underlying characteristics of
car-dependent transport systems
In this section, we review the causal interconnections between the five
elements of car-dependent transport systems (Section 7.1). These have been
briefly discussed in the preceding sections, but are treated here more sys-
tematically. Our review also brings to light four “underlying character-
istics” that cut across the five elements. These are discussed in Section 7.2,
as they provide further insights into the workings of car-dependent trans-
port systems, and have implications for further research, as well as for
political action for environmentally sustainable transport systems.
7.1. Causal interconnections
The interconnections of different aspects of car-dependent transport
systems are shown in Table 3, emerging from the five literatures reviewed
in this paper, and their relationships to each other. Each cell shows cau-
sation in one direction, with the titles of the columns showing the cause,
and the titles of the rows showing the effect. For example, while the au-
tomotive industry influences car infrastructure (through lobbying, for ex-
ample), said infrastructure also helps to prop up the industry by creating
space for the intended use of its primary product. Another example is how
car-dependent land-use patterns develop in synergy with the provision of
new car infrastructure, while at the same time requiring an increased
coordination effort in the provision of public transport. Further relations
between the five elements of car-dependent transport systems are illu-
strated in Table 3. Overall, this exercise shows an elaborate structure by
which different aspects of the political economy of car dependence create
a single, locked-in and self-reinforcing system that is very difficult to
disrupt, while also showing some of the historical co-evolutionary dy-
namics that helped put it in place. Such dynamics are important in re-
vealing that the system is never static, and might change in the future (as
we discuss in Section 7.3).
One limitation of our analysis is that our approach is almost entirely
retrospective, using historical and sociological evidence to highlight the
core elements and tendencies of car-dependent transport systems. These
are formidable obstacles to attempts to develop more sustainable
transport systems in the urgent time-frame required by climate change.
As such, we have deliberately given little consideration to prospective
research on sustainable transport solutions and visions. A more pro-
spective political-economic analysis of potential sustainable mobility
futures would be a good way to expand on the research presented here.
While there is an emerging literature on the governance of innovations
such as ‘smart mobility’ [319,320], and ‘Mobility as a Service’ [321], to
date this has not adopted an explicit political economy perspective.
7.2. Underlying characteristics
We identify four underlying characteristics which appear throughout
our study, and provide deeper knowledge of the creation and maintenance
of car dependence: (1) the role of integrated socio-technical aspects of
provision; (2) the opportunistic use of contradictory economic arguments
serving industrial agendas; (3) the creation of an apolitical façade around
pro-car decision-making, and (4) the capture of the state and other entities
by the complex of car-dependent transport systems.
7.2.1. The role of integrated socio-technical aspects of provision
Studying the interconnections between social and technical aspects
of reality is crucial in understanding the dynamics and constraints of
the automotive industry. The all-steel body car production requires
immense economic capital, requiring large production levels to recover
costs. As a result, the automotive industry cannot deal with downturns.
The production of all-purpose vehicles, a result of the capital intensity
and rigidity of car production, in turn, induces the adoption of car-
dependent practices that become embedded in ‘car culture’.
The appropriation of road space by cars also benefits from being
considered from an integrated socio-technical perspective: the physical
reconstruction of city streets for car use is not socially neutral but
prevents other uses. Spaces physically designed for cars reinforce car
culture, not as a neutral preference, but through spatial coercion. Road
building is presented as a simple physical solution to the problem, often
quantified through the socio-economic lens of lost time and revenue, of
car congestion. This view omits both the physical production of cars
and the economic (private) interests and (public) costs of the con-
struction sector. As these sectors mature together, they benefit eco-
nomically from the physical turnover of the large stock of aging roads
and cars, representing a classic case of socio-technical lock-in.
7.2.2. The opportunistic use of contradictory economic arguments serving
industrial agendas
Integrated socio-technical constraints lay bare the opportunistic use
of economic arguments by various industrial sectors: these arguments
are not based on macro-economic benefits, as they claim, but on the
macro-economy complying with their own economic imperatives. The
first and most important instance we uncovered is in the automotive
industry, which presents its mission as aligned with growth and de-
velopment (more cars are necessary in times of economic expansion),
but cannot cope with lower consumer demand during economic
downturns, and hence demands public rescue packages and subsidies,
moving with agility between supply-side and Keynesian economic ar-
guments to keep itself in business. Similar arguments are made by the
road building industry, with the additional twist that the construction
and road building industry makes strong overt claims that supporting it
during recessions can kick-start growth.
Opportunistic use of economic arguments can also be seen in the
socialized costs of car infrastructure (parking, roads) for private car use:
although car drivers often view themselves as rugged individualists
paying entirely for their own car use, they are being publicly subsidized
at levels possibly similar to public transport users, but through more
obscure mechanisms.
Opportunistic doublethink of a non-economic variety exists as well
in the justification of car-centred pedestrian infrastructure, which is
argued for on the basis of making public space “safe” for pedestrians (by
keeping them off the roads) – but really makes the space “safe” for cars
to drive unimpeded and unchallenged, protecting car supremacy. This
can result in a vicious cycle, where roads become more unsafe for pe-
destrians, require additional “safety” infrastructure, with ever-larger
dominance of cars over public space. A similar vicious cycle can be seen
in the argument for the expansion of motorways and roadways to re-
duce congestion, which results in more traffic and more congestion
through the phenomenon of induced demand.
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7.2.3. An apolitical façade around pro-car decision-making
Car dependence benefits from the creation of an apolitical context of
decision-making, where pro-car decisions are perceived as synonymous
with economic growth, modernity and development, and thus gain
support from multiple factions. To this end, the concentrated jobs in
capital-intensive automobile manufacturing are often used as a bar-
gaining chip to support the automobile industry regardless of other
economic and political priorities.
The subsidies for car-related infrastructure are often similarly pre-
sented as apolitical and thus perceived as normal and fair. Indeed, the
arguments for road-building are oriented to appeal to the political right
(growth, individualism) and left (reducing spatial inequality, promoting
social inclusion), often based on expert appraisal methods that are
presented as scientific and objective, but in fact, often have inherent
pro-car biases. These sit well with broader techno-tale, cultural narra-
tives positioning car transport as superior to other modes. Road-
building then comes to be seen as a neutral indicator of a policymaker's
competence.
Low-density single-family-home land-use planning also comes to be
seen as an apolitical norm, with advantageous financial arrangements
compared to alternatives and creates a political constituency wedded to
car dependence regardless of other positions.
7.2.4. The capture of the state by car-dependent transport systems
The final cross-cutting characteristic of car-dependent transport
systems is the capture of the state and other institutions, like labor
unions. This aspect is obviously linked to apolitical perceptions of cars
and roads as aligned with growth, progress and industrial strength, as
outlined above, but goes further. An initial step in this capture could be
seen in the battle over public space, which the car lobby won, resulting
in the marginalization of pedestrians and other transport modes in road
spaces. Individual battles may be won through lobbying of industry-
related groups, but their outcomes then become entrenched and in-
stitutionalized in specific decision-making processes (regulations),
ministries and budgetary items. The road lobby has been spectacularly
successful in this regard throughout the industrialized world. Beyond
outright lobbying, the scale and economic significance of the auto-
motive industry underpins the phenomenon of ‘state dependence’,
whereby an almost unspoken alignment of interests between state, in-
dustry and labor actors emerges.
Presently visible instances of state- and labor-union capture can be
seen in the unquestioning delivery of support for automotive industries
during economic downturns. These are periodic and overt – however
everyday indirect subsidies of car-dependent transport systems through
support for car infrastructure are entrenched in all industrialized
countries. Investments in car infrastructure become understood as a
core role of the state, whose main function is to facilitate (or even in-
duce) private expenditure and consumption (i.e. on cars). The US
government support of single-family homes constitutes another ex-
ample of this phenomenon. In this way, suburban sprawl can be seen as
the effect of state capture by the car-dependent transport system, rather
than an outcome of citizen preferences (as it is often presented).
7.3. Conclusions and moving forward
Exploring the elements of what we have called car-dependent
transport systems, and understanding their interconnections, exposes a
deeply self-reinforcing system, apparently immune from economic and
political pendulum swings, able to bend the forces that sway the rest of
the society to its purpose. In some ways, it is a comprehensive (and
rather depressing) political economy anatomy of carbon lock-in. Can
we learn any lessons here in breaking free from these interlinked ele-
ments of lock-in? We believe the answer is affirmative.
First, by uncovering the elements of car-dependent transport sys-
tems and their interlinkages, we can understand better the aligned
forces with a stake in maintaining car dependence and be prepared for
their responses. Policies for moving away from car dependence will be
wise to address the five interconnected elements together. Second, we
believe our contribution will make it easier for alternative transport
mode advocates to express their visions: not just as technocratic alter-
natives involving alternative technologies and healthier lifestyles, but
as comprehensive worldviews that challenge an undesirable status-quo.
By understanding the chameleon-like ability of pro-car arguments to fit
within all economic and political discourses, they become easier to
counter.
Third, our analysis of public transport provision suggests that al-
ternatives to car-dependent transport systems will have to be civic-
minded, strategically coordinated for the public good, involving the
overt redistribution of resources from profitable routes and areas to
unprofitable ones through cross-subsidies. Such alternatives cannot
benefit from a purported technocratic or apolitical presentation: in-
stead, they should be argued for on the firm grounds of public co-
ordination and delivery of public goods for all, while continually ex-
posing the hidden workings of car-dependent transport systems.
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